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tion, and expenditure cutting in the state enterprises, especially in the mining 
company  COMIBOL;  (3)  reform  in  the  trade  regime,  aiming  at  the 
elimination of most barriers to international trade and the implementation of 
a  flat  tariff  schedule;  and  (4) normalization  of  Bolivia’s  access  to inter- 
national financial flows from the official creditor community (i.e., the IMF, 
the World Bank, the IDB, and bilateral creditors). 
The political base for implementing this enormous program was established 
in a crucial Pact for Democracy signed by Paz’s MNR and Banzer’s party, 
Acci6n  Democratica  Nacionalista  (ADN).  This  agreement  established  a 
congressional majority sufficient to put through the Congress the key features 
of  Supreme Decree 21060. The pact allowed the decree to take effect in the 
context  of  democracy,  a remarkable accomplishment in view  of  Bolivia’s 
volatile political institutions  and its vulnerable  position  amongst politically 
unstable neighbors in the region. With the pact, the Paz government reserved 
important positions in state enterprises for members of Banzer’s ADN party. 
In addition to the political base of the MNR and ADN, Paz also had strong 
support in  the business  community.  Several prominent  businessmen,  some 
who had been head of the CEPB, were given top Cabinet posts. 
The structural reforms did away with the state-capitalism model, with its 
several variants, that had been followed since the Revolution of  1952. The 
reforms  were carried out  with  a remarkable smoothness. Of  course,  there 
was some bitter opposition, particularly in the labor unions and in the parties 
of  the  left,  as well  as lively  criticism in  the press,  but  the changes were 
peaceful and in the framework of democratic institutions. At no point during 
Paz’s administration was the process of reform imperiled. 
3  State Capitalism and the 
Operation of  the Public Sector 
This  chapter  focuses on the  strategy  of  state capitalism  as the  model  of 
development  in  Bolivia  during  1952-85  and  particularly  on  the  role  of 
public finances, public investment spending, and trade policy in that period. 
We  have already stressed that the Bolivian debt crisis in the  1980s, and the 
economic crisis more generally, can be traced largely to insufficient domestic 
savings and to a very weak public sector, despite the central role assigned to 
the public sector in the development strategy. 
The main  point  that  we  emphasize  is that  while  the  government  faced 
large  and  politically  urgent  demands  for spending-on,  for example,  the 
wages  of  public  sector  workers,  social  objectives  (e.g.,  health  and  edu- 190  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
cation),  the  military,  and  foreign  debt  servicing-the  tax  base  for  fi- 
nancing  these expenditures had  always been  extremely  fragile.  Domestic 
revenues were generally adequate only during periods of  high foreign prices 
of  raw  materials. When  export prices fell,  governments generally tried  to 
maintain spending with funds borrowed from abroad. The real crises arose 
when neither high export prices nor foreign loans could sustain the level of 
government spending. Thus, after 1980 and before the stabilization program 
of  1985, the government was forced to rely heavily on the inflation tax. 
As a general point  regarding the structure of  government revenues,  the 
important thing to notice is that revenues were collected primarily through 
production taxes and foreign trade taxes, collected from a small number of 
activities undertaken by a handful of enterprises. Many, but not all, of those 
enterprises were publicly owned. The tax structure can be seen in table 3.1, 
from Breuer (1988). In 1976, for example, taxes from trade, state enterprises, 
and private mining (which is a production tax on an export good) accounted 
for 49.7 percent of the overall tax revenues. These three sources proved to be 
highly unstable during the 1980s as real tax revenues fell sharply. Trade taxes 
fell as a rising share of trade went through the black market; state enterprise 
taxes fell as profitability of  the state sector declined, partly as the result of 
unrealistic pricing; and private mining profits fell, partly due to terms-of-trade 
decline and partly due to a failure of collections. 
With a tax structure as in  Bolivia, the search for tax revenue was easily 
confounded with the search for investment opportunities for the public sector 
that  could  yield  those  revenues.'  Nobody  was  better  equipped,  it  was 
asserted, than the public sector to seize large investment opportunities, and 
the public sector needed the revenues in order to finance the balance of  its 
expenditures. 
In this setting, the heavy emphasis on public investment projects combined 
with  the  allocation of  public  sector revenues,  necessitated a development 
plan. From  1956 until  1985, the governments emphasized economic devel- 
opment based on public sector planning. The design and implementation of 
Table 3.1  Tax Structure in Bolivia, 1972-80 





























































Sources:  Breuer (1988). table S.I(B), which is based on estimates supplied by  UDAPE  in  the Ministry of 
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development plans were considered essential for rapid economic growth in the 
productive and distributive spheres. The common view on the topic over a 
long period was that centralized planning should be compulsory for the public 
sector and indicative for the private sector. 
In this chapter substantial space is devoted to the public sector investment 
projects as they were framed in development plans, the main conceptions of 
which  shed some light on the projects themselves.  Indeed,  the policy  of 
investing public  income and publicly  guaranteed loans in huge projects of 
resource-based industrialization cannot be fully understood without appeal- 
ing to the main conceptions on development as reflected in the development 
plans. Unfortunately, failed public investments, together with the narrowness 
and  vulnerability of  the  tax  base,  are  the  main  sources  of  the  eventual 
collapse of  the public sector. 
3.1  The Mature State-Capitalism Model, 1969-84 
The most important feature of the state-capitalism model is the degree of 
intervention of  the government in the economy. In  1975, for example, the 
GDP generated in the public sector accounted for 22 percent of  total GDP, 
while in  1982 this ratio reached a high of  28 percent. The data in table 3.2 
are even  more telling,  as they  show the very  high  share of  public  sector 
investment  in  total  investment  spending.  During  1965  -69,  the  public 
investment share in  total  investment was  51 percent; by  1975, the  share 
decreased  slightly  to  48 percent;  during  1976-80,  it  increased  again, 
reaching  an  average  of  60.4 percent.  From  1981 to  1985,  the  ratio  fell 
sharply because of  the deep cuts in public investment spending during the 
financial crisis. It may be noted that from 1970 on, the years of high private 
investment rates  are  also  associated  with  strong  investment rates  of  the 
public  sector.  This  is  in  part  a  manifestation of  state capitalism,  in  that 
Table 3.2  Public and Private Participation in Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(in percentages) 
Year  Public  Private  Year  Public  Private 
1958  42  58 
1959  40  60 
1960  44  56 
1961  45  55 
1962  54  46 
1963  62  38 
1964  60  40 
1965  43  57 
1966  50  50 
1967  50  50 
1968  52  48 
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private investment spending was often closely  tied to specific public sector 
projects. 
It  is  worth  looking  at  some explicit  statements  of  the  state-capitalism 
model contained in several development plans formulated by various govern- 
ments.  Though the  model  has  roots  that  go back  to the  Revolution  and 
even before, we will focus our analysis on the 1969-84  period. In  1969 the 
left-wing populist  government of General Ovando presented to the nation  a 
Socioeconomic Strategy for National Development (SSND). The SSND was 
more “statist”  and nationalistic than the ten-year plan prepared by the MNR 
regime  in  1962.* The SSND clearly defined  a long-run vision of  state-led 
growth, with many  “strategic  sectors”  of production that were reserved to 
the  public  enterprises.  The SSND targeted  an  increase  in  domestic  saving 
based  on the retained surpluses of  the enterprises in the public sector; as a 
counterpart,  and  consistent  with  a  nationalistic  ideology,  it  called  for  a 
reduction of  foreign savings  through  cuts in  foreign direct  investment and 
public external borrowing. 
A  very  important  feature  of  the  SSND  was  the  emphasis  given  to 
resource-based  industrialization.  A  key  theme  was that  big  operating  sur- 
pluses  can  be  generated  in  the  state enterprises  in  the  resource  sectors, 
which in turn can be reinvested in other sectors. In addition, the SSND, in a 
clear  case  of  misjudgment,  relied  quite  heavily  for  the  industrialization 
program on the market prospects offered by the economic integration scheme 
of the Andean Group Pact of  1969, formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Venezuela (Chile belonged originally,  but quit in  1976). With re- 
gard  to agriculture,  the  SSND advocated  a more communitarian  organiza- 
tion of  production,  with  strong emphasis on cooperatives and technological 
improvements. 
The  SSND  was  short-lived,  abandoned  by  President  Banzer  in  1972. 
However, the SSND exerted a powerful influence on the formation of ideas 
in Bolivia that went well beyond  1972. The strongly nationalistic nature of 
the  SSND  appealed  to  the  left  in  the  Bolivian  political  spectrum  and, 
ironically,  to many  high-ranking  officers  in the military.  In  fact,  the  state- 
capitalism  model  reached  its  peak  during  the  government  of  General 
Banzer  and, although  we  can trace  the  origins  of  Banzer’s  model  to  the 
Revolution of  1952, many  of  the most  important concepts  came from the 
SSND. 
The expansion of  the public sector, especially as a producer of  goods and 
services  that  could,  under  appropriate  policies,  be  provided  by  private 
enterprises, indeed constitutes the landmark of the Banzer years. But this did 
not mean a confrontation with the private sector; instead, the policies of  the 
Banzer  regime  aimed  at a  symbiotic  relationship  between  the  public  and 
private  sectors.  Moreover,  and  this  needs  to  be  underscored,  the  public 
enterprises  served  frequently  as a  mechanism  to  transfer  state-owned  (or 
state-guaranteed) resources to privileged groups in the private sector. Access 193  BolividChapter 3 
to government officials and government contracts were considered the most 
important asset from the viewpoint of  many private sector businessmen. 
On the basis of research in progress, Ugarteche (1986) and Rivas (1986) 
claim  that  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  public  sector  external  debt 
accumulated  in  the  Banzer  period  were  private  sector  supporters  of  the 
Banzer  regime.  Also, public employment  was  increased  substantially  be- 
tween  1971 and  1978: many  new public  enterprises were created, and the 
government asserted its monopoly over the developments in the new mining 
sectors  (especially  iron),  as  well  as  in  the  commercialization of  tin  and 
metals. 
In  1975 Banzer announced a five-year development plan. In the summary 
of  the plan  given  by  Malloy  and  Borzutszky  (1982),  the following  points 
stand  out:  (1)  the  plan’s  aim  was  export-led  growth  accompanied  by 
selective import substitution;  (2) it gave the preponderant  role to the public 
sector,  targeting  the  public  sector  for  71  percent  of  total  investment 
spending;  (3) it allocated public  investment primarily  to the production  of 
hydrocarbons;  (4)  it  divided  the  nation  into  three  investment  zones:  a 
primary  zone  of  La  Paz-Cochabamba-Santa  Cruz,  a  secondary  zone  of 
Oruro-Potosi-Chuquisaca, and a tertiary  zone of  Beni and Pando, with the 
share in total investment of the primary zone to be 63 percent; and (5)  it paid 
relatively scant attention to the peasantry. 
Most  of  Banzer’s  five-year  plan  was  never  put  in  place.  Two  factors 
accounted for the failure to implement the plan.  First, the financing of  the 
plan was heavily dependent on Bolivian petroleum  exports which failed to 
materialize.  Second, the public administration  did not adhere to the guide- 
lines  for  the  allocation  of  investment,  so  that  many  public  investment 
projects  were  undertaken  without  due  consideration  for  the  investment 
allocations outlined in the plan.  As this practice became common, the plan 
became wholly unenforceable. 
In the SSND and the five-year plan (as well as in the MNR’s 1962 ten-year 
plan), traditional exports occupy the center stage. In all of these plans, the 
expansion of  traditional  exports was  deemed  to  be  the  “locomotive”  of 
development, with the rest of the sectors of the economy following along. It 
has to be emphasized that nowhere was the conception of Bolivia as an export 
economy abandoned in favor of, for instance, import-substituting activities on 
a large scale. Planners and government bureaucrats did look on an expansion 
of a protected light manufacturing sector with some sympathy, but they did 
not think, given the smallness of the domestic market, that this sector could 
be the engine of rapid economic growth in the near future. Hopes were always 
placed on growth led by exports of primary commodities. 
The model of export-led growth embodied in the development plans that 
we  have  discussed  differed  significantly  from  the  traditional  pattern  of 
growth,  as well as from the export-led models  in the  newly industrialized 
countries (NICs). In contrast to the traditional pattern, based on the export of 194  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
a few primary products, the development plans aimed at a more diversified 
export basket, with the production of  commodity-based goods having more 
domestic value added (e.g., the export of metals instead of mineral ores, and 
refined sugars and oils instead of the crude varieties). Unlike in the strategy 
of the NICs, there was little emphasis on the export of manufactures, except 
for some belated attempts in the context of the Andean Pact market. With the 
emphasis  on  petroleum  and  mineral  exports,  policymakers  placed  little 
importance on exchange rate management to promote new exports or on the 
deepening of  domestic financial markets, though exchange rate and financial 
policies had  played a crucial role in the successful takeoff of  the NICs (cf. 
Tsiang 1986). 
The military successors of  Banzer, by and large, tried to continue with the 
state-capitalism model.  The civilian governments of  Walter Guevara Arze 
and Lidia Gueiler attempted to follow a somewhat less “statist”  course, but 
their efforts were curtailed by  strong political adversities. In 1984 one more 
attempt  was  made  to  develop  a  plan,  with  the  “National  Development 
Strategy and  Four-Year Plan.”  Three different versions of  the  plan  were 
offered  to  the  public.  Because  of  the  internal  squabbles of  the  coalition 
partners in the Union Democratica Popular (UDP) governments in  1984-85 
and the high priority given to the inflation problem, no real importance was 
attached to any of  the versions by the government or the public. 
3.1.1 
The  deficiencies of  planning were  nowhere  more  revealed than  in  the 
execution of  public investment projects. A full evaluation of  investments in 
the very capital-intensive projects has yet to be made. Ideally, information 
should be  gathered for an  ex  ante  and  ex  post  evaluation of  each  major 
project undertaken in  the  1970s and up  until  1985. Short of  that, we  may 
note  the  following points.  First,  many  large projects responded  more  to 
noneconomic factors (prestige, national security, etc.) than to profitability, 
measured  either  in  private  or  social terms.  Second,  grave  mistakes were 
made  in  evaluating  the  endowments  of  natural  resources.  For  example, 
overoptimistic assessments of oil and mineral reserves led to overinvestment 
in  these  industries.  Third,  the  cost-benefit  analyses  performed  before 
undertaking  the  projects  were  either  incomplete or  were  ignored  in  the 
implementation phase.  Fourth,  the  large projects  were  typically  financed 
with expensive suppliers’ credits and foreign bank loans. The conditions of 
repayment were, from the start, likely to create problems in the cash-flow 
stream. Fifth, when the projects were financed with official loans, delays in 
disbursements often disrupted the investment schedules. Sixth, the execution 
of the projects was extremely poor, with frequent but avoidable long delays 
in deliveries and construction. 
Contrary to what occurred in other debtor countries, public investment was 
largely directed to sectors producing tradables or to physical infrastructure, 
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and even in the last case, infrastructure served primarily for the production of 
tradables.  The  problem  in  Bolivia  was  not  an  excessive  allocation  of 
investment  to  nontradables, but  rather  the  highly  inefficient  choice  and 
execution of  investment projects within the tradables sector. Political and 
regional pressures, as well as specific vested interests, held great sway over 
the selection of investment projects and the procurement of construction and 
supply contracts. Graft, of  course, was a very important factor-kickbacks 
and unwarranted cost overruns were the order of  the day. 
Several examples illustrate the assertion of  investment mismanagement: 
the uneconomical expansion of  the tin smelters of  the ENAF company in 
Vinto; the huge Karachipampa polymetallurgic smelter in Oruro for which 
there were no minerals; the expansions in oil-refining capacity in Santa Cruz 
and  Cochabamba when  oil  production was  declining  at  a rapid  rate; the 
refinery for soya oil built close to the Paraguayan border, so far away from 
producing and marketing areas that transportation costs made it completely 
unprofitable; the  very  modern international airport of  Vim-Viru in  Santa 
Cruz, with a traffic load of  no more than fifteen planes a day in  1987; the 
high-cost military-run truck assembly plant of Cochabamba; and so on. 
Even when some projects could have been reasonably profitable under the 
right  circumstances, cost  overruns  and  technical  misjudgments  impaired 
profitability.  For  instance,  the  COMIBOL  plant  for  the  treatment  of 
low-grade ores in La Palca was planned to be built in two years, yet after ten 
years  it was  still unfinished. Similarly, there is the sugar refining mill  of 
Guabira, the abnormally high costs of  which were essentially due to poor 
financial management that  systematically delayed the  sugar harvest by  its 
suppliers, therefore causing a strong fall in  the saccharose content of  the 
inputs. 
It  is  interesting to  note  that  private investment projects  financed with 
foreign resources and public guarantees also showed poor performance, and 
substantial arrears were quickly built up after the loans were made. Loans to 
private firms that were guaranteed by the public sector institution, Banco del 
Estado, were used in white elephant projects and had a very low probability 
of  being  repaid.  Similarly,  the  foreign  loans  channelled  through  the 
state-owned agricultural bank, Banco Agricola Boliviano, to large farmers in 
the eastern lowlands suffered extensive defaults. 
3.1.2  State Enterprises in the State-Capitalism Model 
The  public  enterprises  were,  during  1952-85,  the  main  hope  for 
economic development but also the Achilles’ heel of  the public sector. As 
was shown before, the size of the Bolivian public sector relative to GDP has 
been considerable, far above the average in Latin America. Up to 1983, most 
of  the  larger  public  enterprises were  able  to  generate  savings  in  spite 
of  adverse macroeconomic  policies  (mainly  overvalued  exchange rates), 
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which already showed current account  losses in  1980 (and chronic  overall 
deficits,  when  account  is taken  of  investment  spending)  and the  smelting 
company, ENAF, which had troubles since its inception. For the other firms, 
however,  the savings were usually insufficient  to finance capital investment 
and debt servicing. As a result, the public enterprises were among the main 
borrowers internationally, as an increasing  share of  their capital outlays  in 
the 1970s were financed by foreign savings. 
For  several  reasons,  however,  it  is  very  difficult  to  evaluate  with  any 
accuracy  the  performance  of  individual  enterprises.  There are  simply  too 
many  distortions  in  financing  and  pricing  to  make  such  a  retrospective 
analysis  feasible.  Complex  cross-subsidies  among  the  state-owned  enter- 
prises distort the measured profitability of individual firms. A case in point is 
that  of  ENAF,  which  was  heavily  subsidized  by  COMIBOL.  Also,  the 
National  Enterprise  of  Electricity  (ENDE) subsidized  all  the  other  public 
companies through low electricity tariffs. 
A further complexity in evaluating the state enterprises is the need to place 
the  enterprises  in  a  macroeconomic  context,  while  also  taking  careful 
account of trends in the international economy. The net incomes of the state 
enterprises are much more sensitive to macroeconomic policies than are the 
profits  of  private  sector  enterprises.  The  temptation  to  suppress  the 
symptoms of  inflation by manipulating the prices of the public enterprises or 
by  delaying a devaluation  of  the  official  exchange rate, for example, is a 
constant  danger.  Lags  during  1982-85  in  raising  public  sector  prices 
(especially  petroleum products)  and in devaluing the official  exchange rate 
brought heavy losses to the public enterprises. As we shall note in chapter 5, 
the complete  mismanagement  of prices of publicly  provided goods was  an 
essential feature of  Bolivian policymaking in  1982-85. 
To  help  understand  the  behavioral  choices  of  the  state  enterprises  in 
Bolivia,  it  is  relevant  to  introduce  here  the  concept  of  the  soft  budget 
constraint, as introduced by Kornai (1986) to explain the behavior of public 
sector firms in  socialist economies. The essential  idea is that  normal  bud- 
getary  constraints  on a firm’s  behavior  do not  hold  in  socialist economies 
since  the  firm’s  managers  know that  in  case  of  trouble, the  firm  will  be 
bailed out by  subsidies or credits  from the central government.  As  Kornai 
points out, this leads to a nearly insatiable demand for public sector credit, 
since “sooner or later it can expect to be able to cover its costs on input, and 
if  its proceeds  on sales of  output are insufficient,  it  will  be  able to cover 
costs from an external financial source” (44). Also, state enterprises facing a 
soft  budget  constraint  lack  incentives  and  sanctions  to  stick  to  their 
production goals and to limits on use of resources. 
This  situation characterized  most  state enterprises  in  Bolivia  during  the 
period  up  to  1985  (and  to  some  extent  afterward).  During  the  1970s, 
individual firms could borrow  internationally on the full faith and credit of 
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strained them from doing  so,  with  the result,  as we  saw in the previous 
section, of  a series of  disastrously inefficient and uneconomical investment 
projects. The problem of soft budget constraints was especially severe during 
the high-inflation years of  1982-85.  It was relatively easy to find  ways to 
escape the budget constraints, for instance by  delaying tax payments of the 
enterprises  to  the  central  government,  accumulating  liabilities  and  then 
shifting them to the Treasury, gaining access to heavily subsidized Central 
Bank loans, or contracting foreign debt beyond their needs when they could. 
Many state enterprises also suffered from a confusion of  objectives: they 
were asked to generate profits to be reinvested, as well as to be shifted to 
other sectors; to generate employment, frequently as a disguised scheme of 
unemployment  compensation; to  provide education and  health  services to 
workers plus their families; and to act as a retirement fund and as a means to 
channel subsidies to the general consumer. This multiplicity of  objectives 
impaired their normal functioning, as might be suspected. 
Most  perniciously,  state  enterprises  were  used  as  a  form  of  political 
patronage and spoils to bolster the political power base of  the government. 
For  this  reason,  employment  in  state  enterprises  increased  remarkably 
rapidly  in  the  1970s,  far  outstripping the  growth  of  population  and  the 
economy in general. Between  1970 and  1982, state enterprise employment 
rose at an annual rate of 4.6 percent. Political pressures played an important 
role in the expansion of jobs during these years. In fact, a nonnegligible part 
of  the  support  for  the  Banzer  government  and  the  succeeding  military 
regimes was the willingness to create employment in the public sector. The 
return to democracy in  1982 was  also accompanied by  a big spurt in the 
expansion of jobs in  the most important public enterprises, particularly in 
COMIBOL. The  distribution of  sectoral ministries and  public  enterprises 
among  the  parties  in  the  UDP  coalition  led  to  an  unrestrained race  of 
political  patronage.  The  patronage  of  the  Communist Party,  through  the 
Ministry of  Mines that it controlled, was especially notorious. 
In  the  same  vein,  Rivas  (1986),  Ugarteche  (1986),  and  many  other 
Bolivian  analysts  also  claim  that  it  was  through  the  mismanagement  of 
public  investment  projects  that  the  public  foreign  debt  was  diverted  to 
private  beneficiaries,  often  with  political  goals  in  mind.  In  this  direct 
way,  the  public  debt  financed  consumption  and  capital  flight.  While 
the  government  of  Bolivia  retained  the  commitments,  the  benefits  were 
privatized. 
3.1.3  The Public Sector as “Shock  Absorber”  for External Shocks 
The  public  sector was  frequently used  to  absorb,  at  least  temporarily, 
external shocks hitting the economy. For instance, while YPFB reaped some 
important  benefits  and  the  Treasury  substantial taxes  from  the  oil  price 
increases of  the  1970s,  each  of  these  could  have  been  greater  had  the 
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consumption.  The protection  of  some consumers  from  the  oil  shocks was 
made  at  the  expense  of  taxes  and  profits  for  the  oil  enterprises.  The 
opportunity  costs of  this policy were high.  Moreover, as some oil products 
were  smuggled  out,  the  subsidies  gave  much  to  the  contrabandistas 
(smugglers) in addition to the general consumer. 
In some cases, not only  opportunity  costs were incurred but  also heavy 
Treasury disbursements were spent in s~bsidies.~  For instance,  when world 
prices  of  wheat  and  other grains  climbed  during  1974-75  and  in  1979, 
domestic prices of  wheat were kept constant,  with the Treasury  making up 
the  difference  between  import prices  and  domestic  prices.  Moreover,  the 
government established de facto price support schemes for some agricultural 
staples, like sugar and rice. These price support schemes were very costly in 
years of  low international prices and good harvests. 
The essential point is that the fiscal sector was used to isolate the economy 
from external fluctuations.  When the shocks were transitory,  this policy  did 
not  have  important consequences.  However,  as adverse  shocks  frequently 
lasted  longer  than  expected,  significant  debt  accumulation  ensued.  The 
domestic price repercussions of  those deficits  went unnoticed  as long as it 
was  possible to finance  them by borrowing  from abroad.  The government 
deficits that resulted from subsidies was one of the channels that led to the 
financing of consumption with foreign debt. 
In some cases, the “shock  absorber”  function was used for the protection 
of a very narrow part of the elite.  A good illustration is the case of  cotton 
growers in the Santa Cruz region during the Banzer period. Tens of millions 
of dollars were loaned by the government’s agricultural bank (Banco Agricola 
Boliviano) to a small number of  large landowners during an incipient cotton 
boom. The Bolivian producers sold their crops forward on world markets, but 
then tried to renegotiate when the spot-market prices rose above the forward 
contract price. They failed in the renegotiations and, in the end, much of the 
cotton remained undelivered.  The growers quietly defaulted on the agricul- 
tural bank  loans and the government absorbed the losses with no attempt to 
collect or to foreclose on any property. To this day, the bad cotton loans have 
undermined the solvency of  Banco Agricola. 
3.2  The Chronic Weakness of Public Sector Revenues 
In Bolivia, the sources of income for the public sector have suffered from 
extreme fragmentation  since the beginning  of the Republic.  Before the tax 
reform measures of 1986, there were many central government taxes with as 
many  collecting  agencies;  local  taxes;  and  taxes  earmarked  for  regional 
development corporations,  the state universities,  and for the social security 
system. In part because of this extreme fragmentation and in part because of 
notoriously  bad  record  keeping  for  tax  collections,  it  is  hard  to  make  a 
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The combined accounts of  the central administration, the social security 
system, and  the so-called decentralized agencies form the central govern- 
ment  accounts. If  one adds to the account  of  the  central  government the 
accounts  of  the  local  governments,  this  gives  the  general  government 
accounts. The general government accounts together with the accounts of the 
nonfinancial  state  enterprises  form  the  consolidated  nonfinancial  public 
sector. Note that transfers between parts of the system are very important for 
the consolidated nonfinancial public sector. Public enterprises pay  taxes to 
(and on occasion receive subsidies from) the central administration and some 
local  governments.  Central  administration  transfers  to  the  decentralized 
agencies and local governments are very substantial. 
Finally, the quasi-fiscal activities of  the financial public sector (i.e.,  the 
Central Bank of  Bolivia, together with the state banking system) should be 
consolidated with  the  nonfinancial  public  sector  accounts to  get  a  com- 
prehensive view  of  the  fiscal  activities of  the  overall  public  sector.  Be- 
cause  of  data  limitations,  this  complete consolidation would  be  virtually 
impossible for historical data. 
The best recorded data for the public sector are found for the account of 
the General Treasury of  the Nation, TGN (Tesoro General Nacional), which 
handles  the  accounts  for  the  central  administration  and  which  has 
traditionally been under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. We  now 
turn to a look at revenues of the TGN. 
3.2.1 
From  1961  to  1970, central  administration revenues  amounted  to  8.0 
percent of  GDP on the average; in the next decade this ratio increased to 
10.2 percent, with a slight rise in the second half  of  the decade compared 
with  the first half.  The maximum  ratio  of  revenues to  GDP of  the TGN 
occurred in 1976 (12 percent of GDP). Data on revenues, expenditures, and 
the deficit, from Breuer (1988), are shown in table 3.3 for the years 1970 to 
1984. 
The rise in revenues as a percentage of GNP from the 1960s to the 1970s 
was  due  to  a  determined effort to  improve tax  administration and  to  an 
increase in  the tax base  because of  the expansion in  the value of  exports 
during the 1970s. However, after 1979, inflation started to take its toll on the 
real value of  tax collections, in line with the so-called Olivera-Tanzi effect 
(see Tanzi 1977), which predicts a negative relation between inflation rates 
and real tax collections. During the high inflation years, the TGN revenues 
were as low as 2.8 percent of GDP in 1984 (and fell to only about 1 percent 
of  GDP in the first quarter of  1985!). We  shall describe in chapter 5 more 
precisely how the high inflation made a shambles of the Bolivian tax system. 
Changes in  the structure of  the TGN revenues should also be noted.5 In 
the  1970s, taxes collected by  the internal revenue service amounted to 34 
percent of  the  TGN revenues,  while  taxes  on  the  foreign  sector, mainly 
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Table 3.3  Budget Revenues, Expenditures, and the Deficit, 1970-84  (as percentage 
of  GNP) 
Year  Revenues  Expenditures  Deficit 
1970  8.4  9.8  1.4 
1971  7.9  10.0  2.1 
1972  7.6  10.0  2.4 
1973  9.  I  10.6  1.5 
1974  11.5  11.9  .4 
1975  11.3  12.6  1.3 
1976  12.0  14.0  2. I 
1977  11.5  13.8  2.2 
1978  11.4  14.0  2.7 
1979  9.4  14.3  4.9 
1980  9.6  16.0  6.4 
1981  9.4  15. I  5.6 
1982  4.6  26.9  22.3 
1983  2.6  20. I  17.5 
1984  2.6  33.2  30.6 
Sources: Breuer  (1988),  table  5.5,  which  is based  on  estimates  supplied  by  UDAPE  in  the  Ministry  of 
Planning, Bolivia. 
import tariffs, represented 31 percent on the average. The remaining sources 
were production taxes on the mining and petroleum sectors, which averaged 
31  percent.  Property  income  and  services  provided  by  the  central 
government yielded 4 percent of  the TGN revenue. By the end of  the hy- 
perinflation,  however,  tax  collections  on  internal  income  and  on  inter- 
national  trade  had  been  sharply  eroded.  Only  the  taxes  on  petroleum 
production  could  be  easily  collected  in  the  short  term,  even  after  the 
hyperinflation stopped. Therefore, in 1985, the year that stabilization began, 
taxes on petroleum represented no less than 64 percent of  TGN revenue. We 
return to this point in chapter 5. 
In  regard  to  the  composition  of  internal  taxes  (more  precisely,  taxes 
collected by  the  internal revenue  service  and  excise  taxes  on  petroleum 
products), the most important component during the normal years  1975-78 
was taxes on consumption and sales. The share of personal income taxes in 
total internal taxes  has  never  been  above 25  percent.  The contribution of 
corporate income taxes was likewise modest, never going beyond 23 percent 
of internal taxes. 
Until the tax reform of  1986, property and  road  taxes were local taxes 
collected and earmarked for the municipalities and did not enter the TGN 
coffers. It is very hard to locate data of good quality for local governments, 
so only gross trends can be suggested. As happened with the TGN revenues, 
there was a slight improvement in  tax effort during the  1970s, but  in the 
1980s,  property  taxes  and  vehicle  taxes  suffered  very  much  with  high 
inflation. Not only did lags in payments affect the real value of collections, but 
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behind inflation, so that real property values for tax purposes fell sharply 
during the high-inflation period. Some municipalities in dire financial straits 
asked  for,  and  obtained,  frequent  direct  transfers  from  the  TGN.  The 
financing problems of the regional development corporations, the universities, 
and the social security system were also acute during the high inflation period. 
3.3  Management of Public Expenditures 
The chronic weakness of  public sector revenues and the low profitability 
of  public  investment  spending  explain  a  large  part  of  the  overall  fiscal 
disaster in Bolivia in the 1980s. Also important were the dynamics of public 
sector spending on  the current account of  the  budget  (i.e.,  other than for 
capital expenditures). The key  point here is that  debt-servicing costs rose 
sharply in the  1980s just as the availability of  new financing dried up. The 
government was  squeezed by, falling tax revenues (due to rising inflation), 
higher expenditure charges (due to rising interest payments), and an inability 
to finance the resulting gap (as well as the deficit levels inherited from the 
1970s) through foreign borrowing. The result was a turn to the inflation tax. 
Unfortunately, there is a profound difficulty in tracing interest payments 
carefully through the budget since the interest obligations were at various 
points charged to the state enterprises, the central administration, and the 
Central Bank. We  will be able to review in  chapter 5 some data on overall 
interest payments made to foreign creditors, but without precisely specifying 
how the spending was allocated among various parts of  the public sector. 
As in the preceding section, a detailed analysis of expenditures must focus 
mainly on the TGN because of a lack of information regarding other parts of 
the state sector. Precisely because of the shifting of various financial burdens 
among different parts of  the state sector, a focus on the TGN is not only 
incomplete, but may sometimes even be misleading. TGN expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP were 9.6 percent on average in the decade of the sixties, 
12.2 percent in  the  seventies,  and  16.7 percent from  1981 to  1985. The 
evolution of  overall  expenditures was  shown  in  table  3.3. The  large in- 
crease  in  overall  spending  after  1981 is  mostly  accounted for  by  a  rise 
in  debt-service expenditures and  in  transfers to  financially strapped state 
enterprises. 
The composition of  the TGN expenditures for selected years is shown in 
table 3.4. Note that in the  1970s, personnel expenses were generally about 
half of  the total. In 1982, however, interest costs on the foreign and internal 
debt rose sharply, and payments to the Central Bank, also apparently related 
to foreign debt,  accounted for about two-thirds of  overall expenditures. In 
1984, interest  costs  fell  sharply  as  Bolivia  suspended  payments  on  the 
commercial bank debt. 
Was  the central government profligate  between  1970 and  1985? A key 
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Table 3.4  Structure of Expenditures in  the Central Government, 1970-84 
(as percentage of  total expenditure) 
1970  1976  1980  1982  1984 
Personnel  54. I  42.4  46.4  20.8  59.7 
Materials  I .4  6.3  7.3  3.0  5.5 
Transfers  16.3  16.6  11.6  10.0  19.8 
Debt service  13.6  2.1  16.3  26.8  7.6 
Other  14.6  22.7  18.4  4.1  7.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources:  Data refer to central  government  (TGN) and are based on  the data given  in table  5.4 of  Breuer 
(1988), which in turn were provided by  UDAPE in the Ministry of  Planning, Bolivia. 
Payments to Central Bank  .o  .0  .0  40.7  .0 
central administration increased by  92.4 percent between 1970 annd  1982, 
yielding an average annual rate of growth of 5.6 percent. This rate of growth 
was  well  above that  of  the  urban  population and  of  GDP,  with  the  main 
increases occumng  between  1970 and  1976. We  know  from  the  political 
analysis that succeeding administrations used patronage as a way to cement 
patron-client relations, and thereby build a political base of support. It does 
indeed seem that the result was a profligate and inefficient overextension of 
public sector employment. 
Expenditures on investment that were on average around 2 percent of GDP 
during 1976-79 fell to around 0.3 percent during the crisis years of 1981-85. 
Since central government investment expenditure is mainly on social over- 
head, the impact of its substantial reduction has important repercussions on 
income  distribution  and  on  growth.  The  fall  in  this  particular  type  of 
investment will have long-lasting effects, the magnitude of which has not yet 
been fully appreciated. 
4  Trade Policies, 1970- 85 
It should be recalled from our overview in chapter 1 that the long-run growth 
of  the Bolivian economy has been critically determined by  the exports of 
primary  commodities,  mainly  tin  and  natural  gas.  Bolivia’s  economy 
depends crucially on the performance of the export sector. In turn, shifts in 
indebtedness have coincided, procyclically, with the export cycle. Bolivia’s 
dollar export earnings during 1970-88  are shown in table 4.1. 
Export  earnings  and,  by  extension,  the  domestic  economy  have  been 
greatly  affected by  the  instability of  Bolivia’s export  prices.  As  a result, 
policymakers have focused on measures to stabilize and improve Bolivia’s 